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Abstract
We simulate the prisoner’s dilemma and hawk-dove games on a real
social acquaintance network. Using a discrete analogue of replicator
dynamics, we show that surprisingly high levels of cooperation can be
achieved, contrary to what happens in unstructured mixing popula-
tions. Moreover, we empirically show that cooperation in this network
is stable with respect to invasion by defectors.
1 Introduction
Some extremely simple games lead to puzzles and dilemmas that have a
deep social meaning. The Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), a universal metaphor
for the tension that exists between social welfare and individual selfishness,
is the most famous game of this type. It stipulates that, in situations where
individuals may either cooperate or behave selfishly and thus defect, they
will rationally choose the latter. Unfortunately, cooperation would be the
preferred outcome when global welfare is considered. Game theory [14] is
the discipline that deals with such situations of conflict where two or more
individuals must make decisions that will mutually influence each other. It
takes a view of collective systems in which global social outcomes emerge as
a result of the interaction of the individual decisions made by each agent.
Another well known simplified model of many common important socio-
economic situations is the Hawk-Dove (HD) game. According to game the-
ory, cooperative attitude should vanish in the PD, and should be limited to
a given fraction in the HD. This is also the case when large populations of
individuals play the game pairwise in a random manner and anonymously,
as prescribed by evolutionary game theory [16]. However, in controlled ex-
periments it has been observed that cooperation actually emerges when the
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game is played by humans and in many other cases [3, 9]. A number of mech-
anisms have been invoked to explain the emergence of cooperative behavior:
repeated interaction, reputation, and belonging to a recognizable group have
often been mentioned [3]. However, the work of Nowak and May [8] showed
that simply arranging the players in a spatial structure and allowing them
to only interact with neighbors is sufficient to sustain a certain amount of
cooperation even when the game is played anonymously and without repe-
tition. Nowak and May’s study and much of the following work was based
on regular structures such as two-dimensional grids (see also [4] for the HD
case). However, while two-dimensional grids may be realistic for ecological
and some biological applications, they are inadequate for modeling human
networks of interactions as it has now become clear that many actual net-
works have a structure that is neither regular nor random but rather of the
small-world type. Roughly speaking, small-world networks are graphs in
which any node is relatively close to any other node. In this sense, they are
similar to random graphs but unlike regular lattices. However, in contrast
with random graphs, they also have a certain amount of local structure, as
measured, for instance, by a quantity called the clustering coefficient which
essentially represents the probability that two neighbors of a given node are
themselves connected (see e.g. [6]). Thus, most real conflicting situations in
economy and sociology are not well described neither by a fixed geograph-
ical position of the players in a regular lattice nor by a mixing population,
and it becomes relevant to study these dilemmas on other, more faithful
social structures. Some previous work has been done in this direction. We
mention Santos and Pacheco’s work on scale-free networks [10, 11] and work
on Watts–Strogatz small-world graphs [1, 12, 15]. However, these network
types, although they have the right global “statistical” properties, are only
an approximation of the actual topological properties of measured networks
of interactions. In the present work we introduce a more socially relevant
network and we emphasize the relationships between community structure
and cooperation. A recent work close to the present one in spirit is Holme
et al. [5]. However, the authors of [5] only study the PD on a much smaller
social network using a different, noisy, strategy update rule, while we employ
the more standard replicator dynamics on a larger social network and also
study the HD game.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We first give a brief
background on the PD and HD. We then describe the main features of social
networks and we present an evolutionary game model on a real collaboration
network. We finally present and discuss results of numerical simulations of
the model in terms of cooperation, community structure and stability.
2
2 The Model
2.1 Social Dilemmas
We first recall a few elementary notions on the PD and the HD games.
These are two-person, symmetric games in which each player has two pos-
sible strategies: cooperate (C) or defect (D). In strategic form, these games
have the payoff bi-matrix shown in table 1. In this matrix, R stands for
the reward the two players receive if they both cooperate, P is the punish-
ment for bilateral defection, and T is the temptation, i.e. the payoff that a
player receives if it defects, while the other cooperates. In this latter case,
the cooperator gets the sucker’s payoff S. For the PD, the payoff values are
ordered numerically in the following way: T > R > P > S, while in the
HD game T > R > S > P . Defection is always the best rational indi-
vidual choice in the PD – (D,D) is the unique Nash equilibrium and also
an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS). Mutual cooperation would be prefer-
able but it is a strongly dominated strategy. Thus the dilemma is caused
by the “selfishness” of the actors. In the HD, when both players defect
C D
C (R,R) (S,T)
D (T,S) (P,P)
Table 1: Payoff matrix for 2× 2 symmetric games.
they each get the lowest payoff; (C,D) and (D,C) are Nash equilibria of the
game in pure strategies, and there is a third equilibrium in mixed strategies
where strategy D is played with probability 1/(2β−1), and strategy C with
probability 1− 1/(2β − 1), where β is another name for the temptation T .
The dilemma in this game is caused by “greed”, i.e. players have a strong
incentive to “bully” their opponent by playing D, which is harmful for both
if the outcome is (D,D).
2.2 Social Networks
In standard evolutionary game theory [14, 16], these dilemmas have been
classically studied by modeling the behavior of a large population in which
randomly paired individuals play the game in an anonymous manner. Non-
rational players are “hard-wired” to play a given strategy, and those faring
better than average increase their share in the population. The fixed points
of these replicator dynamics are evolutionarily stable strategies, i.e. they
cannot be invaded by a mutant strategy [16].
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In terms of networks of interaction, the “mixing” structure of the pop-
ulation would be represented by a complete graph, i.e. any individual may
interact with any other player. The advantage of the mixing model is that it
admits an approach by mean-field methods, which treat the system as being
homogeneous, ignoring space dependences and correlations [16]. However,
we know today that real social networks do not have this random struc-
ture. Instead, they are of finite size, have heterogeneous connectivity, are
often small worlds, in the sense that any individual is only a few steps away
from any other, and individuals cluster together in communities [2, 6, 15].
Therefore, evolutionary games should be studied on more general types of
graphs, to understand the limitations of the theory, and to extend it as far
as possible to structures encountered in real-life.
As stated in the introduction, numerical simulations of evolutionary
games have been performed for degree-homogeneous and degree-heterogeneous
model graphs such as Watts–Strogatz and scale-free networks [1, 10, 11, 12,
15]. Here we go a step further and make use of a real social collaboration
network, the genetic programming coauthorship network. This network is a
small world with a connected giant component of 942 scientists and it has
recently been analyzed [13]. It has clusters and communities and it should
be representative of other similar human acquaintance networks. Watts–
Strogatz networks [15] are only a mathematical construction and do not
properly represent social networks. As for model scale-free graphs, most
social networks studied to date are not of the pure scale-free type, and show
a faster decay of the tail of the degree distribution [2, 6]. Intuitively, there
must be a cutoff in the number of acquaintances a given agent can have, and
in many cases also a typical number of acquaintances, which gives a scale
to the network. Besides, it has been observed that social networks have a
higher clustering than the typical values reached in scale-free graphs, an-
other manifestation of the complex neighborhood structure of the network.
Furthermore, the appearance of communities – sets of densely connected
vertices with sparse connections between the sets – is yet another typical
feature found in social structures. Communities can highly influence the way
information is propagated throughout the network or opinion formation is
processed. Finally, we should make it clear that social networks are dynam-
ical, i.e. new nodes may join the network forming new links, and old nodes
may leave it as social actors come and go. As a first approximation here
we model a static network, thus ignoring fluctuations and non-equilibrium
phenomena.
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2.3 Model Parameters
Population Structure. We consider a population P of players of size N .
Each individual i in the population P is represented as a vertex vi of a graph
G(V,E), with vi ∈ V, ∀i ∈ P . An interaction between two players i and
j is represented by the undirected edge eij ∈ E. The number of neighbors
N(i) of player i is the degree ki of vertex vi. The average degree of the
network will be called k¯. The terms vertex, node, individual, or player shall
be used interchangeably in the sequel; likewise for edge, link, interaction,
and acquaintance.
Strategy Update Rules. To update the strategies of the individuals
given an initial strategy distribution in the population, we use a discrete
analogue of replicator dynamics [4]. Other socially meaningful strategy up-
date policies could also be used, such as imitation of the best and proportional
updating [4, 8, 12]. The replicator dynamics assumes that the share of the
population playing a particular strategy grows in proportion to how well
this strategy is doing relative to the average population payoff.
Let Πx be a player x’s aggregated payoff and kx the number of neighbors
x has (kx can also be seen as the degree of the vertex representing x). We
define the replicator dynamics function φ(Πj −Πi) as being the probability
function according to which player i adopts neighbor j’s strategy, namely
φ(Πj −Πi) =


Πj −Πi
kjΠM1 − kiΠm1
if Πj −Πi > 0
0 otherwise,
(1)
where ΠM1 (resp. Πm1) is the maximum (resp. minimum) payoff a player
could get if it had only one neighbor.
Payoff Calculation. There exist several possibilities for determining a
player’s utility or payoff. One can define a player’s payoff as being the sum
(accumulated payoff ) of all pair interactions with its nearest neighbors. Or
it can be defined as the accumulated payoff divided by the number of inter-
actions (average payoff ). Accumulated and average payoff give the same re-
sults when considering degree-homogenous networks such as regular lattices.
Accumulated payoff seems more logical to use in degree-heterogeneous net-
works since it reflects the very fact that players may have different numbers
of neighbors in the network. Average payoff, on the other hand, smoothes
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out the possible differences although it might be justified in terms of the
number of interactions that a player may sustain in a given time, i.e. an
individual with many connections is likely to interact less often with each of
its neighbors than another that has a lower number of connections. Also, if
there is a cost to maintain a relationship, average payoff will roughly cap-
ture this fact, while it will be hidden if one uses accumulated payoff. In this
paper we use a form of accumulated payoff.
Population Dynamics. Calling C(t) = (s1(t), s2(t), . . . , sN (t)) a config-
uration of the population strategies si ∈ {C,D} at time step t, the global
synchronous system dynamics leads to C(t+1) by simultaneously updating
all the players’ strategies according to the chosen rule. Synchronous update,
with its idealization of a global clock, is customary in spatial evolutionary
games, and most results have been obtained using this model. However, per-
fect synchronicity is only an abstraction as agents normally act at different
and possibly uncorrelated moments. In spite of this, it has been shown that
the update mode does not fundamentally alter the results for replicator dy-
namics [4]. We have also checked that asynchronous update dynamics does
not influence the system evolution in a significant way and so, all results
presented refer to synchronous systems.
3 Simulation Results and Analysis
For each game, we can explore the entire game space by limiting our study
to the variation of only two parameters per game. In the case of the PD,
we set R = 1 and S = 0, and vary 1 ≤ T ≤ 2 and 0 ≤ P ≤ 1. For the HD
game, we set R = 1 and P = 0 and the two parameters are 1 ≤ T ≤ 2 and
0 ≤ S ≤ 1. In the Prisoner’s Dilemma case, P is limited between R = 1
and S = 0 in order to respect the ordering of the payoffs (T > R > P > S)
and T ’s upper bound is equal to 2 due to the 2R > T + S constraint. Had
we instead fixed R = 1 and P = 0, T could be as big as desired, provided
S ≤ 0 is small enough. In the Hawk-Dove game, setting R = 1 and P = 0
determines the range of S (since this time T > R > S > P ) and gives an
upper bound of 2 for T , again due to the 2R > T + S constraint. Note
however, that the only valid value pairs of (T, S) are those that satisfy the
latter constraint.
The network is randomly initialized with 50% cooperators and 50% de-
fectors. In all cases, the parameters are varied between their two bounds by
steps of 0.1. For each set of values, we carry out 50 runs of 16000 time steps
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each. Cooperation level is averaged over the last 1000 time steps, well after
the transient equilibration period.
3.1 Evolution of Cooperation
In Figure 1 we report average cooperation levels for both games for systems
having attained a steady-state. As expected, the region in which cooperation
is possible is much more restricted in the PD than for HD. Cooperation is
more widespread for the HD, as mutual defection is the worst outcome in
this game. For the PD cooperation is sensitive to the “punishment” level
P, for a given T. Concerning the HD, one can see that the S parameter has
moderate influence on cooperation for a given T. We also notice that the
transition from cooperation to defection is much steeper in the PD than for
the HD.
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(a) (b)
Figure 1: Level of cooperation at the end of the simulation. Left: PD; right:
HD. For the HD, the meaningful phase space is the lower left triangle only.
Another important global quantity is the total payoff at the end of the
simulated games, also called the wealth. The cumulated wealth of defectors
and cooperators is plotted in Figure 2 for the PD. This is done for T = 1.3,
for two values of the punishment P, giving rise to two different cooperation
regimes: one in which cooperation prevails and a second one where defection
predominates. We see that the cooperators’ wealth is larger and has a
broader distribution. This hints at a clustering of cooperators, as this is
the only way for them to increase their payoff. We shall comment on this
phenomenon below.
Social networks are characterized by the presence of communities, which
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Figure 2: Cumulative wealth distribution in the PD game averaged over
50 runs for the social network model; (a) T = 1.3, P = 0.1 yielding ∼73%
of cooperation. Average C-wealth=2.92, average D-wealth=0.47; (b) T =
1.3, P = 0.2 yielding ∼15% of cooperation. Average C-wealth=2.30, average
D-wealth=0.11.
can be seen as sets of highly connected vertices having few connections with
vertices belonging to other communities. Finding the communities in a given
network is a difficult task for which there exist several algorithms essentially
based on clustering considerations. We have used one of the algorithms
proposed by Newman [7].
For reasons of space, in the following we show results for the PD only.
In Figure 3 we depict a portion of the scientific coauthorship graph, dis-
tinguishing between cooperators and defectors for the PD. We note that
tightly-bound communities are mostly composed of players with the same
strategy. Although we only show a small portion of the whole network
for reasons of clarity, we could have chosen many other places as the phe-
nomenon is widespread. Cooperators tend to “protect” themselves by having
many links toward other cooperators. On the other hand, a cooperator like
the central one in the largest defecting community will have a tendency to
become a defector since its neighbors are nearly all defectors; but when its
highly connected “wealthy” cooperator neighbor on the left of the figure
is probabilistically selected to be imitated, then it will certainly become a
cooperator again. So, the rare cooperators that are not tightly clustered
with other cooperators will tend to oscillate between strategies. The com-
munity structure of cooperators, together with the mutual payoff advantage
of cooperating, explains the previous observation, namely that the aver-
age cooperators’ wealth exceeds the average wealth of defectors. Strategy
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distribution in communities found for the HD game is qualitatively simi-
lar; however, in the HD the two strategies are slightly more intermingled,
confirming analogous findings for grid-structured populations [4].
Powered by yFiles
Figure 3: Communities: cooperators are represented by triangles and defec-
tors by squares.
When cooperation prevails, we have found that cooperators tend to oc-
cupy the highest degree nodes. When defectors predominate, the degree
distributions of the two strategies tend to be closer, although the coopera-
tors still monopolize higher degree nodes. For HD the results are similar,
namely, degree distribution for defectors fall off more rapidly than those for
cooperators.
3.2 Evolutionary Stability
No empirical investigation of an evolutionary games scenario would be com-
plete without examining its evolutionary stability [16]. Evolutionary stabil-
ity can be defined exactly for mixing populations but qualitatively it simply
implies that a given population strategy cannot be invaded by an individ-
ual playing another strategy. For example, a single defector in a mixing
population of cooperators in the PD will lead to a total extinction of the
cooperators. Single individual strategy mutations are interesting only in
mixing populations or in networks of the scale-free type [11]. In our social
network, the distribution of strategies that obtains when the steady-state
is reached is left undisturbed by this kind of event. However, given that
the C and D strategies tend to cluster together, we have applied a more
9
radical type of perturbations to the system. After the pseudo-equilibrium
is reached, we choose a highly connected individual that plays the strategy
of the majority (suppose it is C) and we flip its strategy to D as well as the
strategy of all its first neighbors that are also cooperators. In this case, evo-
lutionary stability requires that any such small group of individuals who try
an alternative strategy do worse than those that those who stick to the sta-
tus quo. Figure 4 shows the results using the above described perturbation.
In each figure, ten executions have been reported to give a feeling of the
behavior (many more have been run but in the case of noise, average values
are irrelevant). Figures 4 (a), (b), and (c) refer to the PD with P = 0.1 and
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Figure 4: Effect of noisy behavior on pseudo-equilibria states for the PD
(a), (b), (c), and HD (d) (see text for explanations).
three different values of T : 1.5, 1.7, and 1.9 respectively. Figure 4 (d) refers
to the HD with S = 0.1, T = 1.6. The first constant part of the graphs up
to abscissa 0 represent the pseudo-equilibrium values reached in each run
after 10000 steps, just before applying the perturbation. For the PD, it can
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be seen that where cooperation is high (figure 4 (a)), after a transient pe-
riod in which there can be a significant loss of cooperation, all runs tend to
recover the original levels, albeit at different speeds. When cooperation is
at intermediate or lower levels (figures 4 (b) and (c)), the behavior is more
oscillatory but populations tend to recover the original pseudo-equilibrium
levels of cooperation. Even populations that had originally a significantly
lower cooperation percentage can sometimes reach the cooperation level of
the majority of runs after the perturbation. For the HD, populations eas-
ily recover from noisy behavior (see figure 4 (d)), as cooperation is more
widespread in this game. Even for extreme values of T the original cooper-
ation level tends to be recovered (not shown to save space but very similar
to figure 4 (b)).
4 Conclusions
Extending previous work on regular structures and on model scale-free and
small-world networks, in this paper we have empirically studied two funda-
mental social dilemmas on a real acquaintance network. Although the graph
studied is a single particular instance, it possesses all the features that char-
acterize actual social networks, such as high clustering and communities.
We find that this kind of topology allows cooperation to be reached and
maintained, for a large portion of the game parameter space for HD, and
even in the more difficult case of the PD. It was previously known that this
is the case for lattice structures and, most notably, for scale-free graphs.
However, these structures are not good representations of social ties and
thus our result is encouraging from the social point of view. Importantly,
we have also shown that the quasi-equilibria reached by the dynamics are
not ephemeral, unstable states; on the contrary, they are very robust against
perturbations represented by strategy flips of groups of agents. When reshuf-
fled by the perturbation, even population configurations in which defection
prevails either recover the previous level of cooperation or increase it, which
means that this kind of social graphs intrinsically favor cooperation through
clustering and tight communities. In the future, we would like to generalize
these results to classes of social network models.
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